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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST^TE OF UTAH
— — J

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

t

v.

:

ALFRED WILLIAM J. JOHNSON,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 880066

Categoty No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of Burglary, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978),
and Habitual Criminal, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1978).

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 7)8-2-2 (1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the evidence introduced at trial was

sufficient to support the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss
and to support the jury's guilty verdict.
2.

Whether the trial court's inadvertent mention to

the jury of two charges in the charging document prejudiced
defendant's right to a fair trial on the burglary charge.
3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when

it sentenced defendant to consecutive term$ for Burglary and
Habitual Criminal convictions.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The statute relied on in the argument of this case is
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1978).

The text of this statute is:

Any person who has been twice convictedr
.sentenced, and committed for felony offenses
at least one of which offenses having been at
least a felony of the second degree or a
crime which, if committed within this state
would have been a capital felony, felony of
the first degree or felony of second degree,
and was committed to any prison may, upon
conviction of at least a felony of the second
degree committed in this state, other than
murder in the first or second degree, be
determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five
years to life.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with Burglary, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1973), and
with Habitual Criminal, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1978).
Defendant was tried to a jury on the Burglary charge on
December 10, 1987 in the Third Judicial District Court, the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding.

The jury convicted

defendant and then the Court took evidence of defendant's prior
convictions and found defendant guilty of the Habitual Criminal
charge.
On January 15, 1988 the Court sentenced defendant to
serve one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for Burglary
and five years to life for Habitual Criminal, both sentences to
run consecutively to each other.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 29, 1987, John and Eleanor Sargent left
their apartment on Second Avenue in Salt L^ke City to go to lunch
(R. 94 at 19). As they left, Mrs. Sargent locked the door by
pushing in the button in the middle of the door knob (R. 94 at 20
and 46). Mr. Sargent pulled the locked door shut (R. 94 at 20)
and-Mrs. Sargent recalls him "rattl[ing] it a bit" (R. 94 at 47),
Mr. Sargent testified that they had never had any problem with
the door "falling open" (R. 94 at 20).
After having lunch and dropping his wife off at the
University of Utah, Mr. Sargent returned to find the door of his
apartment open about one inch (R. 94 at 22). As he opened the
door he saw defendant standing in the livirkg room just at the
entrance to the bedroom (R. 94 at 23). Mr. Sargent challenged
defendant who responded that he was looking for someone else,
that it was a mistake and that he hadn't taken anything.

He then

asked Mr. Sargent to check and see that nothing was missing (R.
94 at 23). Defendant said all of that at once then added that he
was looking for a friend, Steve Goddard (R. 94 at 23-24).

No one

by that name lived in the building where the Sargents' apartment
was (R. 94 at 24). Mr. Sargent was confused and fearful of a
confrontation with defendant and began checking to see if
anything was missing (R. 94 at 24-25).
On searching, Mr. Sargent found iittle out of place but
did notice that his wife's jewelry box on the window sill was
open with nothing missing; he said that there was nothing of
great value in the box (R. 94 at 26). He 6aid he had not seen
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the lid open before he left for lunch and that their common
practice was to keep the lid shut (R. 94 at 27).
Mrs. Sargent testified that she had not opened the
jewelry box for a year and that it had a thick coat of dust
-because it hadn't been touched for so long" (R. 94 at 48). She
noticed when she returned to the apartment on September 29th that
the lid was open and could see the coat of dust on it still (R.
94 at 49). She also noticed "a couple of fingerprints on it" (R.
94 at 49). She said that they looked like fingerprints but
admitted she had no training in identifying fingerprints (R. 94
at 49-50).

The marks in the dust were "[l]ittle, round spots in

the dust that appear as though they might be fingerprints" (R. 94
at 50). Officers were unable to lift any prints because the
surface of the box was not conducive to obtaining prints (R. 94
at 55).
After checking the apartment and finding nothing
missing, Mr. Sargent went back into the living room and spoke
with defendant (R. 94 at 28). Defendant told Mr. Sargent his
name was "Alf" (R. 94 at 30).
After defendant left, Mr. Sargent thought about the
occurrence and finally came to the decision that he "probably had
entered a burglary in progress " (R. 94 at 29). He then called
the police (R. 94 at 29-30).
The police later presented a photo line-up to Mr.
Sargent and he identified the defendant's photo as being the
person in his apartment (R. 94 at 31 and 56). He also identified
defendant at trial as being the person (R. 94 at 32).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A defendant's intent must be inferred from the facts
and evidence elicited at trial because intent is not susceptible
to direct proof.

If there is some evidence, including reasonable

inferences, which supports the jury's finding that the defendant
had the requisite intent to commit theft, the appellate court
should affirm the jury's verdict.

Enough evidence was presented

at trial to support the jury's verdict in this case.
The trial court's inadvertent mention of two charges in
this case, without more, was harmless error and this Court should
not overturn the jury's verdict on such a technicality.
The consecutive terms imposed in this case for Burglary
and Habitual Criminal is a proper enhancement for a persistent
offender and does not violate double jeopardy standards.
Defendant is being punished for committing ^n additional felony,
not for the previous criminal acts.

Running the two prison terms

consecutively is a proper enhancement for continued criminal
activities by this defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT.
On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient
evidence presented at trial to support his conviction.

A review

of the evidence, however, reveals that defendant's claim is
without merit.

-«u

The Utah Supreme Court pointed out in State v. Booker,
709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), that where a defendant claims the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, the standard
of review is narrow.
"[W]e review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from
it in the light most favorable to the verdict
of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction
for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted." State
v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983);
accord State v. McCardell, Utah, 652 P.2d
942, 945 (1982). In reviewing the
conviction, we do not substitute our judgment
for that of the jury. "It is the exclusive
function of the jury to weigh the evidence
and to determine the credibility of the
witnesses. . . . " State v. Lamm, Utah, 606
P.2d 229, 231 (1980); accord State v. Linden,
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983). So long as
there is some evidence, including reasonable
inferences, from which findings of all the
requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. . . .
Id. at 345 (emphasis in original).
Defendant maintains that the jury could not have found
that the defendant had the requisite intent to commit a theft
based on the evidence introduced at trial.

As this Court said in

State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985):
Defendant's argument is based only on his
interpretation of the evidence, which is not
the only reasonable interpretation. A
contradictory version of the facts, without
more, is not a ground for reversal. State v.
Buel, Utah, 700 P.2d 701 (1985). . . . We
assume that the jury chose to believe the
evidence that supports the verdict. State v.
Carlson, Utah 635 P.2d 72 (1981).
Id. at 234.

Defendant did not present any evidence and the only
version of his encounter with Mr. Sargent in the Sargent
apartment came from the victim.

Based on tfte testimony given by

Mr. and Mrs. Sargent, a reasonable jury could infer that
defendant had the requisite intent for a burglary conviction.
This Court has often reiterated the proposition that a person's
0

intent must be inferred from surrounding circumstances.
Specific intent, need not be proved by
direct evidence, and, of course, is always
subject to denial by an accused. The factfinder , however, is entitled to draw all
reasonable inferences from the facts and from
the actions of the defendant. As this Court
stated in State v. Peterson, 22 Utah 2d 377,
453 P.2d 696 (1969):
With respect to the intent: It
is true that the State was unable
to prove directly what was in the
defendant's mind relative to doing
harm to the victim; and that he in
fact denied any such intent. However, his version does not establish the fact nor does it even
necessarily raise sufficient doubt
to vitiate the conviction. If it
were so, it would lie within the
power of a defendant to defeat
practically any conviction whiqn
depended upon his state of mine}.
[453 P.2d at 69]
State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1979) •
There were sufficient facts given at trial to support
the element that defendant entered the apartment with the intent
to commit a theft.

The door had been locked when the Sargents

left at 1:00 p.m. (R. 94 at 20 and 46-47) but was ajar when Mr.
Sargent returned.

The door was not wide open as when someone

enters looking to see if someone they know is there, but open
only one inch as if to conceal the fact that someone had entered

(R. 94 at 2 2 ) .

Defendant was not near the outside door as if he

had just entered and was calling out to see if anyone was home
but was across the living room near the bedroom entrance as if
just coming out of the bedroom (R. 94 at 2 3 ) .
Nothing had yet been taken which could mean that the
burglary had just begun and that there was little of value to
ta)cfe (R. 94 at 25-28).

The defendant's first words to Mr.

Sargent were that it was a big mistake and that he hadn't taken
anything

(R. 94 at 2 3 ) .

The jury might have found that that was

a curious statement for defendant to make at that point.
While nothing had been taken, a jewelry box had been
disturbed as if defendant were looking in it to find something of
value (R. 94 at 2 6 ) .

Mr. Sargent noticed this because it was

"strange" that the box was open (R. 94 at 2 6 ) .

Mrs. Sargent

testified that while she had not specifically checked the box
before leaving, she hadn't opened it in about a year and that it
had a thick coat of dust on it (R. 94 at 4 8 ) .

She noticed what

she thought were fingerprints in the dust (R. 94 at 49) which her
husband could not have left that day because the box was already
open when he noticed it (R. 94 at 2 6 ) .
Defendant makes much of the fact that when defendant
partially pulled out his pockets, Mr. Sargent didn't see any of
the Sargents' property or any burglary tools.

Mr. Sargent

testified that he didn't check all of defendant's pockets (R. 94
at 36-37 and 44) and so Mr. Sargent was not able to say that the
defendant didn't have any burglary tools or credit card with
which to pick a lock.
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Defendant's conciliatory manner 4nd his statement when
confronted by Mr. Sargent are indicative of one who had been
caught in the act of burglary but had not yet had a chance to
take or conceal anything.
try to talk his way out.

He wanted to placate Mr. Sargent and
He knew that he had not yet taken

anything so his best course was to brazen it out and hope that
Mr. Sargent would be confused and let him go.
what happened.

This is exactly

He had allayed Mr. Sargent's suspicions long

enough to make his get-away but not enough to keep Mr. Sargent
from having second thoughts.
From all of these circumstances surrounding the
occurrence, a reasonable jury could infer that defendant intended
to steal but had been caught in the act.

All defendant's story

to Mr. Sargent about a Steve Goddard, for whom he was looking,
could be seen for what it was—a ruse to confuse Mr. Sargent.
Since there is "some evidence, including reasonable inferences,
from which findings of all requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made,"

Booker, supra at 345, this Court must

affirm the jury's verdict.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR WHEN IT MENTIONED TWO COUNTS IN THE
INFORMATION BUT ONLY READ ONE TO THE JURY.
During voir dire the trial court made the following
statement:
THE COURT: This case is entitled State of
Utah, plaintiff vs. Alfred William Johnson,
Jr., defendant. Am I correct? That the
trial as to both counts, am I not^
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(R. 94 at 9). The prosecutor immediately asked to approach the
bench and a discussion was held off the record.

Then the court

proceeded:
THE COURT: There is one count entitled
"burglary . . .
(R. 94 at 10). No further mention of another count was made and
voir dire continued and a jury was selected.

A recess was taken,

opening statements given and the noon recess taken.

On return

from the noon recess and before the jury was brought in,
defendant moved for a mistrial based on the trial court's mention
of a second count (R. 94 at 14). The prosecutor argued that the
court had not revealed the nature of the second charge so there
were no grounds for mistrial.

The court agreed that no harm had

been done but offered to make* a curative statement to the jury.
Defendant declined, feeling that a corrective statement would
"only further complicate the matter" (R. 94 at 15-16).

Thus,

defendant did not allow the trial court to cure any possible
error but seeks to try to correct on appeal.

Since defendant did

not allow the trial court to correct any alleged error it is
specious for him to now appeal that issue.

See State v. Hales,

652 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1982).
The court's inadvertent statement mentioning two counts
did not prejudice defendant.

The matter was not belabored which

might have fixed it in the jurors' minds.

There is no showing in

the record that the jury was influenced by the statement.
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984).

See

During their

deliberations the jury sent out two notes containing questions
but neither involved questions about another charge (R. 64).

There is no reason to believe that the brief mention of a second
charge swayed the jury in any way.
In a similar situation in Nevada that Supreme Court
affirmed a defendant's conviction.

That case was more egregious

than the present one because a portion of the habitual criminal
chajrge was actually read to the jury.
Finally, appellant contends we must
reverse his conviction because a small
portion of the habitual criminal charge
contained in the information was
inadvertently read to the jury by the
district court clerk, contrary to the mandate
of NRS 207.010(5). Here, the appellant
exercised his 5th Amendment right and elected
not to be a witness in his own behalf. Any
material error with respect to the reading of
the criminal charge would militate against a
defendant's right to silence. The statute
precludes any reference to the habitual
charge during the trial of the primary
offense. A review of the prior offenses
makes it clear why appellant may have
determined not to take the stand. The
statute speaks in terms of "charge," and
although there was reference to "habitual
criminal" made by the court clerk, none of
the convictions were alluded to. Had they
been, prejudicial error may have occurred.
Jones v. States, 564 P.2d 605, 607 (Nev. 1977) (footnote
omitted).
This Court has maintained that:
We are firmly committed to the proposition
that the rules of law and procedure must be
adhered to, particularly in a criminal case.
But once a fair trial has been afforded the
defendant and a verdict which is supported by
the evidence rendered, the proceedings are
presumed to be valid; and we are not disposed
to reverse for mere technicalities or
irregularities unless they put the defendant
at some substantial disadvantage or had some
material bearing on the fairness of the
proceedings or its outcome.
State v. Valdez, 432 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1967) (footnote omitted).

Since no mention was made of the substance of the
second charge (indeed, the fact of a second count was barely
mentioned), the defendant's right to a fair trial was not
prejudiced.

This Court should not overturn the conviction on a

mere technicality.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SENTENCED DEFENDANT
TO AN ENHANCED SENTENCE FOLLOWING HIS
CONVICTION ON THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE.
On January 15, 1988, defendant was sentenced to an
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison for the burglary charge and an indeterminate term of five
years to life for the habitual criminal charge (R« 94 at 108).
The court ordered that the sentences run consecutively saying
"with the record that this individual has, I don't think he has
earned any kind of consideration in not running the sentence
consecutively."

(R. 94 at 107.)

Defendant raised no objection

to the sentence at that time but now challenges it on appeal.
Utah habitual criminal statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-810001 (1978) states:
Any person who has been twice convicted,
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses
at least one of which offenses having been at
least a felony of the second degree or a
crime which, if committed within this state
would have been a capital felony, felony of
the first degree or felony of second degree,
and was committed to any prison may, upon
conviction of at least a felony of the second
degree committed in this state, other than
murder in the first or second degree, be
determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five
years to life.

Defendant claims that sentencing him to a "separate and
consecutive sentence" violates the statutory provisions of the
habitual criminal statute and the protection against double
jeopardy (Br. of App. 14). Defendant, relying on State v.
Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985) and cases from the jurisdictions
of Colorado and Idaho, claims that his sentence was not enhanced
by the consecutive term of five years to life, but was, rather, a
separate consecutive sentence for being an habitual criminal in
violation of double jeopardy protections.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld
habitual criminal statutes when assailed on double jeopardy
grounds.

In Gryqer v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948), the

Supreme Court stated that the adjudication ^s an habitual
offender "is not to be viewed as either new jeopardy or
additional penalty for the earlier crimes.

It is a stiffened

penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an
aggravated offense because a repetitive one,"
v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559 (1967).

See also Spencer

This Court has also

consistently upheld the constitutionality of the habitual
criminal statute, both under the previous ai^d current statutory
provisions.

State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1978); Thompson

v. Harris, 107 Utah 99, 152 P.2d 91 (Utah 1944).

The Utah

statute has been upheld when assailed specifically on double
jeopardy grounds.

State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 286 (Utah

1985).
This Court currently has before it two cases in which
the same question was raised, State v. Stilling, Case No. 870094
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(Utah filed April 7, 1988) and State v. Williams, Case No.
870095, (Utah filed June 6, 1988).

In the Stillinqs case,

defendant is asking that his sentence of five years to life for
Aggravated Robbery be replac€»d by a similar term for an Habitual
Criminal conviction which was ordered to run concurrently.

To do

so would be to negate to a C€»rtain extent the enhancement
provisions of the Habitual Criminal statute.

Replacing a five

years to life sentence with another five years to life term does
not enhance the sentence for the persistent offender.
In the present case, the triggering offense is a second
degree felony which mandates a sentence of one to fifteen years.
To replace the sentence for the Burglary which triggered the
Habitual Criminal charge with the term required by the Habitual
Criminal statute would increase the incarceration in this case.
On the other hand, it would also trigger a claim of
disproportionate sentences.

The defendant in a case similar to

Stillinqs, who has the sentence for his triggering offense
replaced by the sentence for Habitual Criminal, does not receive
a longer indeterminate sentence.

But if, as in the present case,

the triggering offense is less than a first degree felony, the
sentence for the triggering offense is replaced by a longer
indeterminate sentence.

This defendant's punishment is enhanced

by the trial court's order but the sentence of one convicted of
an underlying first degree felony is not enhanced in the same
fashion.
The sentence imposed on defendant was in compliance
with the statutory provision and the purpose underlying the
statute.

M

The habitual criminal statute does not create a new
1 A _

crime; it merely enhances the punishment for the conviction of a
crime committed when the defendant has theretofore committed at
least two other felonies and been committed to prison therefor."
State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah ^.978) (emphasis
added).

The purpose underlying the habitual criminal statute was

further defined in State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah
1983) when this Court stated that the purpobe is to "make
persistent offenders subject to greater sanctions."
The habitual criminal statute does not state that the
prescribed period of imprisonment of five y£ars to life replaces
the sentence for the present conviction.

Nor does it expressly

tack on a specific indeterminate term of years to run
consecutively as does, for example, the firearms enhancement
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (197$).

The statute

merely states that once the elements of the charge have been
established, the defendant shall "be determined as a habitual
criminal and be imprisoned in the state prison for from five
years to life."

Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1978).

The typical double jeopardy argument is similar to the
argument raised in State v. Bailey, 712 P.2<(i 281 (Utah 1985),
that is, that the habitual criminal provision violates
prohibitions against double jeopardy because the defendant is
receiving double punishment for earlier convictions.

Courts have

universally rejected this argument because, instead of twice
punishing a defendant for an offense, the habitual criminal
provision enhances the punishment for the current offense.

Moore

v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 676-77 (1895) (increased severity of
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punishment for present offense is not second punishment for
previous offense); Gryger v. Burke 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948)
(sentence as habitual criminal is not additional penalty for
earlier crimes, but stiffened penalty for latest crime which is
considered to be aggravated because it was repetitive); Zeimer v.
Turner, 14 Utah 2d 232, 381 P.2d 721, 723 (Utah 1963).

In

Bailey, a case in which the defendant was convicted on a habitual
criminal charge and sentenced to an indeterminate term of five
years to life for that conviction, this Court rejected the double
jeopardy claim and stated that "the defendant properly received
an enhanced sentence for his latest conviction."

712 P.2d at

287.
Under this reasoning, it is of no consequence how the
enhanced penalty is procedurally imposed, e.g., addition of a
specific term of years, a specific minimum mandatory term (as in
the 15 year minimum imposed under the previous Utah statute),
substitution of a greater sentence for a lower one, or, as done
under the current statutory scheme, tacking on an additional
indeterminate term of five years to life, regardless of whether
it runs concurrently or consecutively.

The purpose and effect

remains to enhance the punishment for the latest criminal
conviction, not to punish for the second time a prior criminal
act/ and not to separately sentence for the criminal act of being
an habitual criminal.

In the present case, the added term of

five years to life as enhancement for the present convictions
does not violate provisions against double jeopardy.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and any information which may
be brought out on oral argument, the State asks this Court to
uphold the jury's verdict and the sentencing imposed in this
case.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ,^5~ w day of September,
1988.
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